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SCIENTER'S SCOPE AND APPLICATION IN RULE lOb-5 ACTIONS:
AN ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF HOCHFELDER
I. Introduction
Rule lOb-5 was issued in 1942 under the authority granted the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) by § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act. That statute, enacted in the wake of the 1929 Crash, was designed to
eliminate improprieties in the securities market, which common law and then
existing statutory remedies were deemed inadequate to curtail.'
Upon a cursory reading, the purpose of § 10(b) appears evident; nonethe-
less, its enforcement and legal clout has been uncertain. Since its inception, a
semantic debate has ensued as to the precise meaning to be given the statutory
language. In pertinent part it provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly . . . to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange . . . any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
2
Some courts and commentators contend this must be read strictly so as to
proscribe only traditionally fraudulent conduct, i.e., conduct in which actual
knowledge or intent is present, or can be imputed, because of defendant's reck-
lessness.' Conversely, others argue that its scope must be liberally defined so as
to effectuate the Act's broad remedial purpose, and thus extend to proscribe
negligent behavior.4
The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5, which reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (a) To
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any persons in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.5
The effect of this regulation was to extend liability under § 10(b) to purchasers
as well as sellers. Apparently, the rule was not intended to provide a cause of
action for private litigants.' The Commission's intent was to provide a rule
1 For a discussion of the inadequacy of pre-Rule lOb-5, common law remedies and federal
securities laws, see A. JACOBs, THF IMPA-T OF RULE lOb-5, §§ 2,3 (1976).
1976).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
3 See notes 59-78 infra and accompanying text.
4 See notes 52-58 infra and accompanying text.
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
6 Milton Freeman, a SEC attorney at the time of the Rule's promulgation stated that the
Rule "was intended to give the Commission power to deal with this problem [fraudulent
purchases]. It had no relation in the Commission's contemplation to private proceedings."
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
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under which its enforcement powers would be expanded. 7 However, no stan-
dards of conduct which would be regarded as violative of the Rule were pro-
vided. Accordingly, the Commission's efforts failed to resolve the interpretive
problems occasioned by § 10(b).
This absence of articulate standards for liability under the Rule has given
rise to frequent litigation over the past three decades resulting in inconsistent
determinations of the elements constituting a cause of action. In fashioning
standards of liability under Rule 1Ob-5, the interpretive problems encountered
by the courts have been compounded by the numerous forms of relief, based on
varying standards, which have been sought under the Rule.8
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the SEC to enjoin viola-
tions of the Act,9 but does not provide an express right to damages in a private
action under § 10(b). Nevertheless, federal courts have implied a private right
of action from the statute and Rule 1Ob-5."° (The courts have uniformly ap-
plied a negligence standard for SEC injunctive actions.11 ) However, recovery in
actions for damages brought by private parties has been dependent upon court
construction of § 10(b) and the Rule with regard to the requisite mental state
component; some courts require an element of intent, others mere negligence.
Thus, the existence of a private cause of action for damages under Rule 10b-5
has often been a function of the court in which the suit was brought.
To establish uniformity with regard to this issue, the Supreme Court, in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder," held that a private cause of action for damages
will not lie under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 unless scienter is alleged. Scienter, as
defined by the Court, is the "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."'" In
establishing this standard for the mental state component of a 10b-5 violation,
the Court reversed a rapidly developing trend in favor of a mere allegation of
negligence." Although an attempt was thus made to settle an issue which had
been the subject of frequent litigation, the Court's decision has raised other
issues which will undoubtedly arise in future 10b-5 suits.
In a footnote, the Court stated:
In this opinion the term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes
of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Since this case concerns an action for damages we also need not con-
sider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for
injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."
7 Id.
8 See generally, 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD §§ 9,10 (1975).
9 See note 88 infra.
10 A private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 was first implied in Kardon v. National.
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
11 See note 97 infra.
12 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), rev'g 503 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1974).
13 Id. at 1381.
14 See, e.g., Devnir, Rule lOb-5 Damages; The Runaway Development of a Common
Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 76 (1975).
15 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12.
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By implication, the Court avers that the scope of scienter and the form of relief
to which it applies remain subject to debate. Thus, whether the issue of requisite
mental intent in private damage suits has been resolved is questionable. In
declaring a scienter standard, the Court leaves its definition open by declining
to pass on the sufficiency of recklessness. Furthermore, it creates a new issue in
an area of the law that has been well settled, i.e., the necessary intent for SEC
injunctive actions. In essence, the Court invites further litigation by casting
doubts as to the form of behavior which will evoke liability under the Rule.
The purpose of this note is to examine the impact, and to suggest ap-
propriate treatment, of the scienter standard enunciated by the Hochfelder
Court on future suits brought by private parties seeking damages or SEC in-
junctions. To this end, a review of the Hochfelder decision is necessary, since an
understanding of the basis for the Court's conclusion should lend insight into
future treatment of these issues.
II. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
The cause of action in Hochfelder arose when plaintiffs, customers of First
Securities Co. of Chicago, were induced by the president of First Securities to
make investments in a supposed escrow account which ostensibly would yield a
high rate of return. In reality, no such account had been established; the
president had been converting the funds for his own personal use. In further-
ance of this fraudulent scheme, the president introduced a rule which dictated
that only he could open mail addressed to him, even if it arrived in his absence.
The defendant, Ernst & Ernst, a public accounting firm, was retained by
First Securities to perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records and
to prepare annual reports required by the SEC. 6 The plaintiffs charged de-
fendant Ernst & Ernst with "aiding and abetting" First Securities' president's
violation of Rule 1 Ob-5 by negligently failing to perform proper audits. Plaintiffs
contended that if Ernst & Ernst had utilized appropriate auditing procedures
with due diligence, the existence of the mail rule would have been discovered
and reported to the Midwest Exchange and the SEC as an irregular procedure
that prevented defendant from making a thorough audit. Consequently, an
SEC investigation would have revealed the fraudulent scheme.
The Supreme Court recognized that several circuit courts have held in
substance that negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5." Nevertheless, after examining the language of the statute itself
to determine the requisite state of mind, the Court adopted a literal interpreta-
tion, concluding that: "The words 'manipulative or device' used in conjunction
with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to pro-
scribe knowing or intentional misconduct."'"
The Court justified this form of analysis by alluding to other sections of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which establish
specific standards of conduct (including negligence) upon which liability may
16 17 O.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1976).
17 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12.
18 Id. at 1383.
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be predicated and pointing out that § 10(b) is conspicuously devoid of any
standards for liability. From this the Court reasoned that since Congress provided
standards of liability for particular sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the
absence of express standards must lead one to inquire into the actual language
of the statute to ascertain legislative intent.'"
Furthermore, the Court noted procedural restrictions which must be ad-
hered to whenever civil remedies based on negligent conduct provided by the
1933 Securities Act are absent in § 10(b). Recognizing that procedural restric-
tions are more stringent when liability is premised on negligence rather than
intent, the Court regarded this as a further basis for not extending liability under
§ 10 (b) to actions brought for mere negligence.'
Though the Court asserts in a footnote that the opinion is restricted to
private actions for damages," the above reasoning is addressed to the language
of § 10(b) without regard to the nature of relief sought. Thus, looking solely
to the Hochfelder opinion, one could plausibly argue either for extending the
scienter standard to SEC injunctive suits or confining it to private damage
actions.
As the Hochfelder Court points out, an examination that goes beyond the
statutory language itself to the legislative history of the 1934 Act sheds little
light on the intended meaning of § 10(b).22 The purpose and scope of § 10(b)
were never directly addressed in committee hearings prior to the bill's enactment.
The most relevant statement of the section's intended purpose was given by
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters of the 1934 Act, who stated
that "[§ 10(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices' . . . . Of
course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.""
The Court in Hochfelder asserted that this statement clearly negates the inference
that negligence alone is one of the forms of conduct proscribed by this section.
However, the use of "catch-all" strongly suggests that the section should be in-
terpreted in a broad manner, and not restrictively. 4 Thus, the Court's conclusion
that the legislative history of § 10(b) does not provide any "authority for con-
struing 'manipulative devices' to include negligence"'" must be tempered by the
fact that there are no specific statements in the committee hearings and reports
which explicitly exclude negligence.
A considered analysis of the statute must therefore entail an examination of
a combination of factors: the language employed; public policy considerations;
and analogy to common law liability, since the conduct specifically proscribed by
the section has its roots in the common law. As will be seen from an examination
of the treatment afforded § 10 (b) by the various circuit courts, two categories of
statutory construction have emerged based upon these factors. Prior to
19 Id. at 1388.
20 Id. at 1389.
21 See note 15 supra.
22 96 S. Ct. at 1385.
23 Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934).
24 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1968), the court
relied on this statement to construe the "in connection with" requirement of § 10(b) in broad
manner.
25 96 S. Ct. at 1386.
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Hochfelder, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had advocated a negligence
standard for breaches of § 10(b). Upon ascertaining the respective duties of
parties to a securities transaction, a negligent breach of that duty was deemed a
violation of Rule 10b-5. The policy consideration underlying this position was
simply a recognition that securities regulations were enacted for the purpose of
avoiding fraud. Thus, the statutory proscriptions must be construed "not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes."'
0
At the other end of the spectrum was the Second Circuit, whose literal
reading of the words of § 10(b) closely comports with the standard enunciated
in Hochfelder: the words "manipulative" or "device" only refer to intentional,
and not negligent conduct.27
III. Scope of Scienter with Respect to § 10(b)
A. Common Law Fraud and Scienter
Specifically, Rule 10b-5 proscribes fraudulent practices. Hence, an under-
standing of its scope with respect to the inclusion of reckless conduct must begin
with an examination of fraud at common law.
Traditionally, scienter has been required for a showing of fraud. 8 This
scienter requirement for common law actions for fraud and deceit29 has been a
source of continuing controversy"0 since Derry v. Peek." In that case, defendants
issued a prospectus containing a statement which was unfounded. The House of
Lords deemed that an action for deceit would not lie where mere negligence was
shown. Rather, some element of intent had to be found.'2 This exclusion of
negligent misrepresentation from deceit actions has been accepted by a majority
of American courts but has been reversed by English courts which now impose
a duty to make accurate representations."
The scienter or intent standards of common law fraud are met where the
misrepresentor: (a) is convinced of the falsity of his statement; 4 (b) knows that
the statement is most likely false, although in his mind a slight possibility as to the
26 The dissent in Hochfelder took this position, citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
27 See note 18 supra.
28 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
29 The development of a tort action for deceit has usually required the following: (1)
false representation made by the defendant; '(2) knowledge or belief on the part of the
defendant that the representation is false or that a sufficient basis of information to make it
does not exist; (3) an intention to induce plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) justi-
fiable reliance upon the representation; and (5) damage to the plaintiff. See PROSSER at 685-
86. See also, F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF IORTS, § 7.1, at 528 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as HARPER & JAMES]. The second element of the deceit action has ccmmonly been
equated with scienter. PROSSER at 700.
30 See Keeton, Fraud: the Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 583
(1958).
31 14 App. Cas. 337 '(1889).
32 For deceit to be actionable, there must be proof "that a false representation has been
made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be
true or false." Id. at 374.
33 PROSSER at 705.
34 See, e.g., Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Permacrete Const. Corp., 221 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1955);
McNabb v. Thomas, 190 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
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truth of his assertion exists;" or, (c) has no justifiable basis for believing the
truth or falsity of the statement.3 6 In all three situations, fraudulent intent is
deemed to be present. This fraudulent intent exists not only when affirmative
acts have taken place or representations have been given, but also when an
omission or failure to disclose takes place and the relationship of the parties is
such that a duty to make a full and accurate disclosure exists.
The latter two examples evidence conditions under which a statement is
recklessly made. Though the declarant is not certain that his representation is
false or misleading, there is no basis for asserting the truth of the statement. It
should be noted that malice need not be shown for a court to find intent to
deceive," nor is a showing of actual knowledge of falsity a prerequisite to liabil-
ity. Rather, the intent necessary to meet the scienter requirement is a showing
of constructive knowledge; when the defendant's statement is made with such
recklessness, knowledge of falsity will be attributed to him." By contrast, when
the misrepresentor is convinced of the truth of his assertion and this conviction
is fully warranted by the circumstances, no liability for fraud will be found
even though the facts ultimately prove to be false or misleading. 9
A more gray area between misrepresentation, or failure to disclose, and
justifiable belief in the truth of a statement exists when the declarant could
honestly believe in the truth of his assertions, but realizes that the information
upon which he is relying is not conclusive." The majority rule at common law
treats this situation as fraud if statements are made in ignorance of their falsity
and a justifiable belief in their truthfulness is unwarranted. In such a case, an
inference of intent is attributable to the misrepresentor even though actual
intent to defraud or deceive is not present. 1
35 See, e.g., Barrington v. Swanson, 249 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1958).
36 See, e.g., Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
37 This is demonstrated in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 531, Comment b, Illustration
3, at 73 (1938): "A, believing that his brother B is an overcautious investor and wishing to
induce him to buy securities which A believes will greatly increase in value, consciously over-
states the facts in regard to the investment in question. A's good faith is shown by the fact
that he himself has invested a large part of his own capital in the securities in question. The
fact that A's motive is the desire to benefit his brother by inducing him to make a profitable
investment does not prevent A from being liable to B."
38 PROSSER at 701.
39 Some courts and commentators contend that a misrepresentation gives rise to a re-
buttable presumption that the requisite state of mind for fraudulent intent exists. For example,
Dean Keeton, while not excusing intent, has proposed that considerations of fairness to the
victim of the misrepresentation must give rise to a rebuttable presumption with the required
state of mind being proved by circumstantial evidence. To meet the requirements of the
presumption, one must merely allege: '(a) the unqualified assertion of fact by a person in a
position to have reliable information and (b) the nonexistence of such fact or the falsity of the
statement. Keeton supra note 30, at 584.
Were the thesis advanced by Keeton extended to lob-5 actions, it would suffice to bring
an action such as that brought by plaintiffs, Hochfelder et al., to the jury (assuming arguendo
that other elements of lOb-5 liability are not at issue) for a determination of the necessary
element of intent.
40 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 526 (1938) posits that: "A misrepresentation in a business
transaction is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or believes the matter to be otherwise than as
represented, or (b) knows that he has not the confidence in its existence or nonexistence
asserted by his statement of his knowledge or belief, or (c) knows that he has not the basis
for his knowledge or belief professed by his assertion."
41 In what is recognized as a landmark case in establishing the elements of common law
liability for fraud, the court in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441,
rev'g., 229 App. Div. 581, 243 N.Y.S. 179 (1931), held that public accountants certifying as
fact, true to their knowledge that a balance sheet was in accordance with books of account,
[June 1977]
It is evident that belief is the element which distinguishes states of mind
which constitute recklessness from those which constitute mere negligence. 2
Liability for recklessness attaches where one has a genuine doubt as to the
existence of a fact asserted, as well as when the declarant's conduct is so un-
reasonable or careless that an honest or bona fide belief is unjustified."3 To
avoid liability, this doubt or lack of knowledge must be disclosed."' Thus, two
standards emerge upon which liability may be based: (1) the duty arising either
at law or from the circumstances surrounding the situation to make a full and
complete disclosure; and (2) the absence of a genuine belief in the truth of the
representations. In the former, full and accurate disclosure is mandated by the
duty. In the latter, there is no duty to speak. However, once a representation is
initiated it must be made completely and with an honest belief in its truth.
4 5
Case law has established that where a duty to disclose is required, reckless
failure to determine, or to disregard, ascertainable facts constitutes liability for
fraud. Similarly, reckless failure to make an accurate disclosure of all the facts
within one's knowledge concerning an assertion made warrants liability.
46
B. Actionable Conduct under Rule lOb-5, Pre-Hochfelder
Until Hochfelder, the circuit courts of appeal shouldered the task of
interpreting Rule 10b-5 and fashioning the requisite elements for relief. There
are obvious similarities in the rationales used by the different courts in construing
Rule 10b-5. However, because of the complex nature of the statute, there are
significant differences among these rationales. Each circuit's position is qualified
by the weight it gives various* factors, including the relationship between the
parties, the character of the misrepresentor's conduct, and the type of relief
sought.
Accordingly, the courts have failed to establish with uniformity the elements
were not exonerated if the statement was false, because they believed it to be true. Judge
Cardozo, writing for the court, held that an accountant could be liable for negligent misstate-
ments only to the person who hired him or to a person who the accountant knew would rely on
his statements. The court was careful to limit its holding solely to negligent misrepresentations
adding: "Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of fraud. It
does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to justify a finding that they had
no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that,
if less than this is proved . . . the ensuing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by
the contract and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made.
Id. at 189, 174 N.E. 411.
See PROSSER at 701; HARPER & JAMES at 533; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 526, Com-
ment on Subsection (la): "The fact that where the misrepresentation is one which a man
of ordinary care and intelligence in the maker's situation would have recognized as false is
not enough to impose liability upon the maker for a fraudulent misrepresentation under the
rule (§ 526 Conditions Under Which Misrepresentation is Fraudulent), but it is evidence
from which his lack of honest belief may be inferred."
42 PROSSER at 701.
43 See, e.g., Anderson v. Tway, 143 F.2d 95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 861 (1944).
44 Dean Keeton, in response to charges that finding fraud where there is a genuine belief
is an imposition of strict liability, cites to HARPER & JAMES: "The situation actually falls
within and is not an exception to the rule of Derry u. Peek, as one who is skeptical of the
truth of his statements cannot be said to have an honest belief in the truth thereof." As such,
he cogently concludes that the dispute over belief as an exculpatory element is simply
"semantical debate." Keeton supra note 30, at 591.
45 See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
46 PROSSER at 701.
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of a claim under Rule 1 Ob-5." The courts' application of scienter to the require-
ments of a claim under Rule 1Ob-5 has similarly been inconsistent and unclear.
Moreover, the Hochfelder decision affords no guidance with respect to the scope
of scienter.48
In considering proper standards of scienter, the courts agree that actual
intent to injure is not necessary ;" nor is innocent misrepresentation alone an ac-
ceptable standard for imposing liability under Rule 10b-5."° By contrast, con-
siderable debate has centered on whether proof of negligence or recklessness,
rather than actual knowledge, is necessary for a violation of the rule. The
source of confusion in deriving a workable standard for scienter and 10b-5 is
the myriad of situations in securities transactions which come under the purview
of Rule 10b-5 private actions."'
Since predicting recovery under Rule 1Ob-5 entails consideration of many
variables and innumerable interrelationships, scienter cannot be regarded as a
rigid standard; rather, its limits must be imposed with reference to the circum-
stances of the particular case.
1. Negligence: A fortiori adaptation of recklessness
Prior to Hochfelder, the circuit courts were split as to whether negligence
was a basis for a claim under 1Ob-5. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
had adopted a negligence standard based upon requisite duty of care existing
between the two parties to the transaction. In Hochelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 3 the
Seventh Circuit predicated liability upon this duty of care owed the plaintiff by
the defendant. The court established a five point test based upon common law
and statutory definitions of 1Ob-5 violations, for determining when a claim
under the Act will arise: (1) the defendant has a duty of inquiry; (2) the
plaintiff is a beneficiary of that duty; (3) the defendant breaches the duty; (4)
concomitant with the breach of duty there is a breach of the duty of disclosure;
and (5) a causal connection exists between a breach of duty of inquiry and
disclosure, and the facilitation of the underlying fraud. 4
47 It is beyond the scope of this note to explore other elements required for lOb-5 liability:
materiality, reliance, privity, causation.
48 Prior to Hochelder, the mental state element in Rule 10b-5 actions had not been
directly addressed by the Supreme Court. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
49 See JACOBS, supra note I, § 63 n.23.
50 Id. at n.24.
51 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITas LAW: FRAUD, § 8.4, at 204.115 (1971). The author
cogently points out that the source of confusion in deriving a workable standard for scienter
with respect to 10b-5 actions is the myriad situations covered by the Rule when suit is
brought. "A comprehensive scienter standard would have to . . . (include): (1) whether the
violation is a misrepresentation, nondisclosure or some more complex scheme or manipula-
tion; (2) Whether there is privity, a lesser relationship (such as aiding-abetting or conspiracy)
or no privity at all (as in insider trading cases; ...whether the transactions are direct or
indirect; personal or impersonal; (3) Whether there is one plaintiff or thousands; (4)
Whether there is some special relationship between the parties, such as fiduciary-beneficiary or
broker-customer; (5) Whether the relief sought is damages, rescission, injunction or some-
thing else.
52 The Hochfelder Court recognized this split but asserted that few decisions endorsing a
negligence standard have actually involved negligent conduct. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
53 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
54 Id. at 1104. Accord Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
[June 1977]
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Without delineating the elements which constitute liability the Eighth
Circuit in City National Bank v. Vanderboom5 applied a "reasonable investor"
test which inquired whether a reasonable investor was entitled to rely upon a
misrepresentation, considering the existing facts, or, in nondisclosure cases,
whether he was entitled to full disclosure. The court held that negligent conduct
was within the type of behavior 10b-5 based upon its remedial purpose, was
intended to proscribe.
The issue of scienter's scope was avoided by the Ninth Circuit in White v.
Abrams" where the court rejected common law fraud and all state of mind
standardsY There, an inquiry into Rule 10b-5 liability was based solely on the
defendant's duty. Again, the court admonished that securities legislation enacted
for the purpose of avoiding fraud be construed flexibly to achieve this objective.5"
The Hochfelder decision renders moot the debate as to the sufficiency of
negligence in private actions for damages. Nevertheless, the rationale for the
liberal construction given the terms of the statute by those courts advocating a
negligence standard sheds light on how they can be expected to treat the scope
of scienter with respect to Rule 10b-5 after Hochfelder. Since the Supreme
Court in Hochfelder refused to confine the meaning of the term scienter to
actual intent, to the exclusion of recklessness, the willingness of those courts which
have extended the meaning of the statutory terms to include negligent conduct
is a strong indication that such courts will include recklessness as a sufficient basis
for Rule 10b-5 liability.
2. Pre-Hochfelder Inclusion of Recklessness in Rule 10b-5 Actions
Several circuit courts have expressly or impliedly accepted recklessness as a
sufficient basis for a cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In most
instances, the court's application of a recklessness standard parallels the con-
ditions under which common law fraud obtains: the declarant lacks a genuine
belief in the statement's truth, or the representation is made recklessly and a
duty exists to make full and accurate disclosure.59
Since nuance abounds and clearly defined terms are lacking in this area,
the pronouncement of a recklessness standard is often qualified by the particular
facts of a principal case. In Woodward v. Metro Bank,6" a Fifth Circuit case, the
cosigner of a note, who had pledged securities, alleged that defendant bank had
aided and abetted the loan recipient in perpetrating a fraud upon him. The
court required scienter which entailed fraud, but did not require actual intent.
55 422 F.2d 221 '(8th Cir. 1970).
56 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). "The standard we have set forth .. .does not impose
absolute liability for misrepresentations regardless of the person's knowledge of falsity. It rejects
the use of Latin terms which obfuscate the Rule and confuse the result. It rejects the idea that
conduct in complex Rule lOb-5 cases may be neatly compartmentalized into traditional
concepts which have often resulted in jamming facts together in an effort to fit the concept.
While rejecting scienter and state of mind concepts as the standard itself, it requires the court
to consider state of mind." Id. at 736.
57 Id. at 734. See Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace
the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970).
58 495 F.2d at 724.
59 See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
60 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Rather, an element of scienter was required, "at least to the extent that some-
thing more than ordinary negligence [was] required for 10b-5 liability." 1
From their treatment of the scienter requirement when aiding and abetting is
alleged, it is apparent that the Woodward court adopts a recklessness standard.
The court held that where no duty of disclosure exists, a higher standard of
scienter, consisting of some form of actual knowledge or "high conscious intent,"
was required.2 But, where a special duty of disclosure exists, the declarant is
liable upon a lesser showing of knowledge.
This distinction is relevant in applying any liability standard to determine
whether a duty to disclose has been breached. Nevertheless, this determination
must depend on the relationship between the parties. Thus, when one has a duty
to disclose a reckless misstatement or a failure to disclose material facts, even
facts not within one's actual knowledge, are sufficient for a 10b-5 action in the
Fifth Circuit. The result would be the same whether defendant was directly
involved in the transaction or charged with merely aiding and abetting another's
fraud.
Other courts have implied that a reckless breach of the duty to disclose, as
in Woodward, must be present before a claim under Rule lOb-5 arises. In Clegg
v. Conk,63 where plaintiffs were allegedly induced to make investments based
upon defendant's misrepresentations, the Tenth Circuit clearly rejected a
negligence standard. Citing Financial Industrial Fund v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 4 the court recognized the necessity for a scienter standard in Rule 10b-5,
but noted that a duty to disclose requires that a declarant exercise due care in
making statements and, where information is available, that the declarant exer-
cise due diligence in ascertaining the material facts. The court emphasized that
the Rule must be interpreted flexibly and in a manner compatible with its
remedial purpose. The Tenth Circuit thus adopts a literal interpretation of, and
maintains an appreciation for, the purpose of the statute as advocated by those
supporting a liberal construction. As such, the Clegg court is receptive to afford-
ing relief to the extent of the terms' contemporary connotations. This approach
permits the inclusion of recklessness without sacrificing the plain meaning of the
terms as required by Hochfelder.
Several circuit courts have sanctioned recklessness as a sufficient basis for a
1 Ob-5 claim, but have confined its application to cases where the defendant has
actual knowledge of material information. This approach ignores situations in
which a party to a securities transaction has recklessly failed to ascertain facts
available when a duty to do so exists.6" Decisions of the Second Circuit, which
has dealt with the scienter element in 10b-5 actions more extensively (and
stringently) than the other circuits, best illustrate this position.
Beginning with Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co.,6" in which
purchasers in a class action alleged defendant corporation's prospectus contained
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, the Second Circuit required an
61 Id. at 93.
62 Id. at 97.
63 507 F.2d 1351, 1359 (10th Cir. 1974).
64 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
65 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
66 188 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1951).
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allegation and proof of fraud. The court shed some light on the scope of
scienter in Shemtab v. Shearson Hammill & Co.67 where defendant brokerage
firm allegedly failed to sell plaintiff's account as represented, by declaring that a
claim "cannot be bootstrapped into an alleged violation of Rule 10b-5 in the
absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud.
It is insufficient to allege mere negligence."6  While mention was made of
"reckless disregard," the claim alleged actual knowledge, rather than constructive
knowledge, arising from the defendant's recklessness.
The court adhered to its previous position in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.69
where it refused to hold a director liable for failure to disclose material adverse
information absent "substantial participation in the concealment or knowledge
of it."7 The facts in this case can be analogized to the situation in Hochfelder,
since the liability of the defendants with respect to the plaintiffs was premised
on an affirmative duty to perform contracted services and to convey material
information within their knowledge. As in Hochfelder, the basis of the charge
was aiding and abetting the defrauder. The court reaffirmed its holding in
Shemtab: scienter requires actual knowledge, or omissions amounting to a
willful, deliberate, or reckless disregard for truth that is the equivalent of knowl-
edge. In a footnote, the court gave a definition of this language:
In determining what constitutes "willful or reckless disregard for the
truth" the inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defendants
knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being
put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise them-
selves of the facts where they could have done without any extraordinary
effort. Chris Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341,
363-364, 396-399 (2d Cir. 1973). The answer to the inquiry will of course
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature
and duties of the corporate positions held by the defendants. 71
Obviously, from the definitions given by the court, notice is significant when
the existence of recklessness is asserted. In the absence of notice, a question arises
as to the extent to which the defendant's duty requires him to ascertain material
facts before recklessness will be found. The definition advanced by the court
does not refer to the situation in which a defendant, though not having notice
of a material misstatement or omission, nevertheless has failed to fulfill his duties
so that the breach constitutes reckless disregard or constructive knowledge.
Following Holchfelder, several district courts within the Second Circuit have
considered the Supreme Court's definition of scienter. In response to plaintiff's
allegation that defendarits negligently managed her portfolio, the court stated in
Carroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,72 that "Under the law in this Circuit-and
certainly after the Ernst decision-such allegations, in the absence of an allega-
tion of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud or intentional misconduct,
67 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
68 Id. at 445.
69 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
70 Id. at 1302.
71 Id. at 1306 n.98 (emphasis added).
72 416 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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are insufficient to state a claim under Rule lOb-5."'  The court made note that
the Supreme Court left open the possibility that reckless behavior might con-
stitute a violation of the Rule, stating that "even were we to assume arguendo,
that recklessness is a sufficient predicate for 1Ob-5 liability, plaintiff's allegation
would not meet the court's scienter standard." 4 The court thus implies that the
issue of whether recklessness is an element of scienter remains unresolved.
This reasoning was followed by the same court in Siclaro u. Rio de Oro
Mining Co." In absolving a newspaper from liability for publication of factually
incorrect information the court declared:
Absent an allegation of facts which would indicate that the defendant
had some reason to doubt the truth of the statements contained in the
article, 10b-5 liability does not exist.76
Again, the court makes reference to recklessness, stating that "even assuming...
that reckless disregard for the truth can, under certain circumstances, satisfy the
scienter requirement, . . . the allegations do not give rise to such recklessness.""7
The use of "even assuming" reaffirms the lack of resolution within the Second
Circuit for including recklessness as a 1Ob-5 basis of liability.
On the basis of the pre-Hochfelder cases decided in the Second Circuit, it is
clear that recklessness, constituting a basis for a 10b-5 action, exists when the
defendant has actual knowledge of material facts and fails- to make a full and
accurate disclosure. Though actual intent may be lacking, implied intent can be
found. This comports with common law principles of fraud, as certainly no
genuine belief in the truth of the disclosure could exist on the part of the
declarant where material facts are within his knowledge. Nor could an omission
be justified where there was a duty to disclose material information. However,
there is no authority in the cases for finding 1Ob-5 liability where a party's harm
arises from reckless failure to ascertain material facts in the absence of actual
knowledge or notice that such facts exist.
The post-Hochfelder decisions by district courts within the Second Circuit
do not shed any further light on this issue. These holdings are examples of the
circuit's nebulous posture with respect to the scope of scienter, and do not in-
dicate clearly a position with regard to an acceptance of recklessness as part of
the scienter requirement.
C. Future Scope of Scienter in Rule lOb-5 Actions
As demonstrated above, the common law provides recovery for actions in
fraud or deceit when recklessness is proved. Recognizing the Supreme Court's
holding that the language of the statute itself conveys an intention to proscribe
fraudulent practices in securities transactions, it logically follows that common
law elements of fraud should be incorporated into the elements constituting
73 Id. at 1000.
74 Id.
75 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REPm. (COH) 1 95,672 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).




liability under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. Thus, the Supreme Court's limiting of
10b-5 liability to a charge alleging scienter should not preclude an action based
on recklessness, whether that recklessness precipitates failure to make a full and
accurate disclosure or to ascertain material facts in the absence of actual knowl-
edge.
Support for this can be found in Alexander v. McLean, 8 the opinion which
addresses most extensively the issue of recklessness' inclusion within the purview
of the 10b-5 scienter requirement. There, an accountant misrepresented that a
corporation's accounts receivable were sales when they were actually consign-
ments. This induced plaintiff to purchase the corporation's securities. The court
found that this amounted to recklessness sufficient to establish liability under
Rule 10b-5. It reasoned that the inclusion of recklessness in common law deceit,
together with the legislative history and intended purpose of 10b-5, justified a
finding of liability upon a showing of recklessness.79 The defendant accountant
not only had actual knowledge of material facts which he failed to disclose, but
was reckless in failing to inquire into internal inconsistencies where available
facts demonstrated a need for a satisfactory explanation from management.
Thus, the defendant was held to a recklessness standard not only in making full
and accurate disclosure of facts within his knowledge but also in ascertaining
facts at hand. 0 This holding is less susceptible to an attack alleging an insuf-
ficient mental state, because it incorporates the principles of common law fraud
into the area of securities regulations.
The Court in HochJelder emphasized the intended meaning of the statutory
language of Rule 10b-5. Because the Court construed the statute as proscribing
fraudulent conduct,"' common law elements of fraud are appropriate guidelines
for ascertaining 10b-5 liability. An incorporation of common law fraud which
requires absence of genuine belief of the truth, and a duty to make full and ac-
curate disclosure, would help eliminate many of the interpretation problems
which exist. With the exception of the Second Circuit (and then only with
respect to reckless failure to determine the facts where a duty exists), prior hold-
ings within the various circuits find that recklessness is a sufficient ground for
establishing 10b-5 liability.
Obviously, additional factors (e.g., privity, type of remedy sought, whether
an affirmative statement or omission is the source of controversy, and the parties
involved) must be considered when liability is determined. However, these
elements go to the degree of conduct which must be reached before liability will
obtain-not whether recklessness itself is a sufficient condition for a 10b-5 cause
of action. Recklessness cannot be considered a static concept. Rather, it must be
perceived as a standard which will be determined by the attendant circumstances
of the particular case.
78 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D.C. Del. 1976).
79 Id. at 1084.
80 Id. at 1086.
81 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. Extension of Scienter Standard to Injunctive Actions
The Hochfelder Court declined to consider whether a scienter standard
would extend to actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for injunctive relief.8 2
In considering the impact of the Court's position upon future suits seeking in-
junctive relief based upon Rule 1Ob-5, the purpose of, and requisite elements
for, such relief should also be examined from a perspective of legislative intent,
prior case law, and public policy.
A. Purpose of Injunctive Relief under Rule 10b-5
Injunction actions are brought to halt current, foreseeable, or, in some
instances, past violations of securities regulations by issuers, broker-dealers or
investment advisors, or any other person connected with a securities transaction. 3
Typically, an injunctive decree is a court order commanding a defendant to
refrain from committing acts that violate the law, or to do certain acts necessary
to achieve compliance. Enforcement of the decree is usually achieved through
the traditional contempt powers of the federal district courts. If a defendant
fails to comply, he may be prosecuted for civil or criminal contempt.84
B. Source of Authority to Bring Injunction Actions
A right to injunctive relief has been implied for private parties by the courts
under § 10(b). This remedy, however, is rarely invoked.8" Since an aggrieved
party's harm is usually "after-the-fact," damages or rescission provide more
compensatory relief. Recognizing that "an honest and true securities market is
dependent upon the effective enforcement of the legislative mandate in these
acts,"" and that improprieties in the securities market place have a pervasive
adverse impact, Congress granted the SEC in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 the express right to seek injunctive relief. Thus, § 21 (d) authorizes SEC
injunctive actions for violations of the Act, and the rules promulgated there-
under, by declaring:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is en-
gaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of
any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, . . . it may
in its discretion bring an action ... to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining
order shall be granted .... 87
82 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Dott, 302 F.
Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp., 171 F. Supp. 711, 718 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1977 (1961).
84 See, Matthews, Criminal Prosecution under the Federal Securities Laws and Related
Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 901
(1971); A. Matthews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 REv. SEc. REG. No. 4 (1972), in A.
MATTHEWS, B. FINKELSTEIN, & H. MILSTEIN, ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS (1973).
85 See, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973).
86 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 393 (1934).
87 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1970).
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Inherent in the SEC's authority to seek injunctions is the resort to equity.
Once equity jurisdiction has been invoked, all traditional equitable powers may
b applied in the form of ancillary relief."8  Such additional or alternative
remedies often include: (1) the appointment of a receiver; 9 (2) restitution or
disgorgement of profits;9" and, (3) rescission.9 Hence, the issue of the extent to
which a scienter standard will be applied, as raised by the Hochfelder decision,
necessarily affects these forms of relief. However, it is beyond the scope of this
note to examine the impact of the decision on these equitable forms of relief.
C. Traditional Requisites for Obtaining Injunctive Relief
Section 21 (d) requires that, before an injunction will issue, the SEC must
demonstrate by a "proper showing" that a person "is engaged or about to engage
in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter, [and]
the rules .. thereunder."92 Relying solely upon this section, an injunction will
be granted against a person "engaged or about to engage" in a proscribed act
whether the act is performed willingly, negligently or innocently. However, since
§ 21 (d) does not prescribe a culpability standard, application of the injunctive
powers which it authorizes to an alleged lOb-5 violation will require the Com-
mission to demonstrate that such acts constitute a violation of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.
The elements of a "proper showing" vary according to the type of injunctive
relief being sought. The SEC may seek one of three forms of injunctions;
(a) a temporary restraining order (TRO); (b) a preliminary injunction; or
(c) a final or permanent injunction. Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governs TROs and requires that "immediate and irreparable injury"
will accompany further alleged statutory violations.93 For a preliminary or
permanent injunction, the Commission need not meet Rule 65(b), but rather
must show that past conduct and circumstances show a threat or reasonable
likelihood of future violations.94 This is a somewhat more relaxed standard than
that required of a private litigant seeking injunctive relief. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the equitable powers of a court are broader and more
flexible when a public agency sues than when redress is sought by a private party,
because the public interest is involved.9"
It is well established that acts or omissions resulting from a lack of due
88 "There is little doubt that § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act confers general equity
power upon the district courts." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08.
89 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. 5th Ave. Coach Lines, 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
90 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 796 (1969).
91 See, e.g., SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
92 See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
94 See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); 401 F.2d at 1100;
270" F.2d 249.
95 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960);
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 331 (1944); H. Pitt & J. Markham, SEC Injunctive Actions,
6 REv. SEc. REG. No. 5 (1973) in DEFENDING SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (1973).
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diligence, or negligence, can be enjoined under Rule lOb-5." Thus, proof of
intent to mislead or scienter is unnecessary. However, proof that past conduct
was wilfully fraudulent enhances the likelihood of finding "a reasonable expecta-
tion of continued violations.... .""
The decision most often relied upon in support of this position is the
Supreme Court holding in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau."8 This case
refutes the notion that scienter applies regardless of the nature of relief being
sought. Although the case concerned alleged violations of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940,"9 the principles espoused by the Court are equally ap-
plicable to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act since the Court explicitly made reference to
the common purpose of the two acts.00
In establishing that intent to injure was not a necessary element in an
action to enjoin conduct which operates "as a fraud or deceit" under the Act,
the Court recognized that, at common law, intent is a necessary element for
recovery of damages. The Court was quick to point out that the relief sought in
the case, a preliminary injunction, was prospective and equitable and that at
common law a party seeking equitable relief based on another's fraud was not
required to prove intent to defraud."' In support of this the Court pointed out:
The content of common law fraud has not remained static. It has
varied, for example with the nature of the relief sought, the relationship
between the parties, and the merchandise in issue. It is not necessary in a
suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required
in a suit for monetary damages. . . .We cannot assume that Congress in
enacting legislation to prevent fraudulent practices by investment advisers,
was unaware of these developments in the common law of fraud. Thus,
even if . . .Congress had intended, in effect, to codify the common law of
fraud... it would be logical to conclude that Congress codified the common
law "remedially" as the courts had adapted it to the prevention of fraudulent
securities transactions by fiduciaries, not technically as it has traditionally
been applied in damage suits. ... 1.02
Similar to the discussion concerning the inclusion of recklessness in the definition
of scienter, common law principles with respect to fraud provide a basis for
distinguishing between the form of relief sought and the necessary degree of
culpability.
This rationale has been followed by several circuit courts with respect to
injunction actions under Rule 10b-5. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,"°' Judge
Friendly cited the Capital Gains decision as the basis for issuing an injunction
against parties who had negligently prepared a press release. 4 More recently,
96 See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Bromberg, supra note
8, at § 8.4; Note, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 COLUM. L. Rv. 1057, 1076 (1969).
97 458 F.2d at 1100.
98 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
99 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-20 (1970).
100 375 U.S. at 186.
101 Id. at 193.
102 Id. at 195.
103 401 F.2d 833.
104 Id. at 868.
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the Second Circuit stated that the negligence standard is "generally applicable
to SEC injunctive actions ... .""'o The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have followed
this lead.' Only the Sixth Circuit requires a higher standard than negligence-
"wilfull or reckless disregard for the truth."'0 7 Nevertheless, it has recognized
that Capital Gains may require a lower standard for SEC injunctive actions than
is required in a private suit for damages.
D. Confining the Hochfelder Decision to Private Actions for Damages
In spite of prior case law, there are several arguments for extending the ap-
plication of the scienter standard articulated in Hochfelder beyond private suits
for damages. The Hochfelder Court specifically stated that the language and
history of § 10(b) is dispositive of its interpretation." 8 At least one post-
Hochfelder case, SEC v. Bausch & Lamb, °9 interpreted this statement as ad-
vocating the application of a scienter standard to SEC injunctive suits. The
court refused the SEC's request for an injunction against a corporate officer
charged with "tipping" nonpublic earnings figures. Referring to the Supreme
Court's holding in Hochfelder that the language and history of § 10(b) is dis-
positive, the court reasoned that this must be so for SEC injunctive suits, since
such suits. are creatures of the statute rather than implied rights of action."'
A second argument is that the Court's refusal to expressly set out rules con-
cerning the necessary standard of intent and the remedy sought evidences an
intent to apply a scienter standard to all 10b-5 actions without regard to the
nature of the relief being sought. However, prior case law and the traditional
policy considerations associated with equitable forms of relief, along with what
legislative history exists, clearly mandate a contrary conclusion.
The rationale of the Court in Capital Gains is still persuasive evidence of
the Court's intent to distinguish the necessary elements for injunctive relief from
those required in an action for damages. When equity is invoked at common
law, it is well established that the requirements for recovery are diminished. This
distinction is firmly entrenched in securities litigation and was recently re-
affirmed by the First Circuit in SEC v. World Radio Mission,"' the only circuit
court case to pass on the issue of scienter and SEC injunction actions in light of
Hochfelder. In affirming a lower court injunction against a religious organiza-
tion for failing to properly report interest bearing notes, the court pointed out
that "An injunction is designed to protect the public against conduct, not to
punish a state of mind.""' 2 Thus, the court, while recognizing the necessity of
scienter in a private action for damages under Rule 1 Ob-5, declared that intent
is irrelevant in an SEC action for an injunction."'
105 SEC v. Management Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
106 See, e.g., SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d
1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
107 SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
108 96 S. Ct. at 1391 n.33.
109 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
110 Id. at 1240.
111 544 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1976).
112 Id. at 541.
113 Id. at 540.
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In addition to cases directly addressed to the issue which support a negli-
gence standard for injunction actions, or at least a standard less stringent than
scienter, Hochfelder is one in a series of Supreme Court decisions which limit the
remedies of private plaintiffs under the federal securities laws. These cases do not
limit, however, the remedies of the Commission."' This trend is consistent with
that of the Court enunciated in Hecht v. Bowles:. 5 the equitable powers of the
courts should be applied more broadly and flexibly when a public agency sues
because of the public interest involved.
An additional basis for refusing to expand the application of the scienter
standard announced in actions for injunctive relief can be found in the legislative
history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act was the
precursor to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act; the principal difference between the two
is that the 1933 Act afforded relief only to sellers of securities. Prior to passage
of the 1933 Act, the bill was amended so that the requirement of wilfulness and
intent to defraud to obtain an injunction was deleted."' The Seventh Circuit
relied upon this in refusing to require an allegation and proof of scienter in a
Commission injunctive action."7 Considering the lack of known legislative intent
concerning § 10 (b), this incident is doubly significant.
Finally, the policy that prompted the Supreme Court to relax the evidentiary
burdens for injunctive actions brought by the SEC,"' i.e. the need to protect
the public's interest, should be applied to the necessary mental state element.
Where violations of the Rule can affect vast numbers of investors, the potential
harm outweighs the need for a stringent intent standard. Furthermore, not only
must the nature of the interest to be protected he considered for purposes of
policy, but also the type of harm to be prevented. Injunctive relief invoked in
equity is prospective in nature and recognizes the imminent danger to the peti-
tioning party, whether that be a private plaintiff or the SEC, should subsequent
violations occur. Thus, provided the burden of proof requirements are met,
less stringent intent standards should suffice.
V. Conclusion
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act was enacted to avoid the problems which
arise from inadequate regulation of securities transactions. Though the history of
§ 10(b) fails to specifically state the drafters' intent, the description of the pro-
vision as a "catch-all,""' 9 and the purpose of the act itself, mandate a broad and
remedial construction of the terms of the statute. Such a treatment of securities
legislation designed to prevent abuses was expressly sanctioned by the Supreme
114 Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975) (Plaintiff seeking injunctive
relief based upon § 13(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970), must establish ir-
reparable harm according to traditional prerequisites of equitable relief.); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) (Plaintiffs must be actual sellers or
purchasers of securities in order to bring a private action for damages under Rule lOb-5) ; See
Berner & Franklin, Scienter and SEC Rule 10b-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal in Light
of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 769, 779 (1976).
115 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944).
116 H.R. RaP. No. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
117 SEC v. VanHorn, 371 F.2d 181, 184-86 (7th Cir. 1966).
118 See, 321 U.S. at 331.
119 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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Court in Capital Gains.' Moreover, to interpret the section in a restrictive and
technical manner would ignore these purposes and fail to recognize their com-
mon law foundations.
The Hochfelder decision removes considerable speculation as to the neces-
sary element of intent for private damage actions under Rule 10b-5. However,
the case should not be interpreted further as modifying accepted elements of
fraud that have been incorporated into § 10(b) in a manner that strains both
common law principles and the 1934 Act's intended purpose. Recklessness
clearly falls within the construction given common law fraud today. Therefore,
when considering the abuses which the Act expressly proscribes and their com-
mon law bases, recklessness is inherently included in the language of § 10(b) as
the Alexander... court concluded.
Similarly, the distinction between requisite elements for equitable relief as
opposed to damage actions is grounded in the common law of fraud. This dis-
tinction has been widely recognized and incorporated in securities legislation
designed to prevent fraudulent conduct, and is motivated by the policy considera-
tion that suits in equity prospectively vindicate important public and private
rights. To disregard this distinction in the absence of an express denial by that
Court which has affirmed its existence in the law would be a gross deviation from
the opinion itself, case law precedent, and common law precepts.
Hochfelder should be interpreted as defining the necessary intent for a
private action for damages under Rule 10b-5 consistent with the common law
meaning to be given the statutory terms. As such, the Court's intent to establish
a scienter standard is achieved without sacrificing the Rule's "remedial purpose."
Of course, the ultimate resolution of these issues is for the courts. Based
upon pre-Hochfelder standards of intent for Rule 1Ob-5 private damage actions,
it is fairly certain that recklessness will be included within the scope of scienter.
All of the federal circuits have either expressly advocated a negligence standard,
and thus sanctioned recklessness, or specifically provided that recklessness would
suffice. Only the Second Circuit has qualified its endorsement of a recklessness
standard by including it within scienter's scope where actual knowledge is
present. That court, however, has not addressed the situation in which a party's
harm arises from reckless failure to ascertain material facts in the absence of
actual knowledge.
Interpretation of the Hochfelder decision as signaling a retreat from tradi-
tional standards of liability when equity is invoked is unlikely. Though the
Court raised the issue of extending the application of a scienter standard to SEC
injunctive actions by declining to pass on the question, distinguishing necessary
standards of intent based on the nature of relief sought is firmly entrenched in
the law. As evidenced by the holding in World Radio Mission, the mere fact that
the Court has required a scienter standard for private damage actions upon a
determination that the statute is intended to proscribe fraudulent conduct does
not suggest that the Court is inclined to waive this fundamental distinction.
D. Craig Martin
120 See text accompanying note 102 supra.
121 See text accompanying note 79 supra.
NOTES
